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Our recent brain imaging study 
(Chambon et al. 2012) found evidence 
that the interaction between the 
angular gyrus of the parietal cortex, 
and the action selection centres in the 
prefrontal cortex, plays a key role in 
the prospective sense of agency. When 
incompatible primes interfered with 
the decision of which action to make, 
the angular gyrus activation at the time 
of action selection showed a negative 
correlation with sense of agency 
over action outcome. This negative 
correlation had been observed 
before, and was explained in terms 
of prediction‑outcome matching. In 
contrast, our study found that angular 
gyrus might compute non‑agency at 
the time of action selection, and not 
just retrospectively once outcomes 
were known. This study found no 
relation between angular gyrus 
activation and sense of control on 
compatibly‑primed trials, suggesting 
that this area monitors a signal related 
to difficulty and conflict during action 
selection, rather than the normal 
smooth flow of agency (Figure 1C). 
Moreover, the lateral prefrontal 
cortex, which is responsible for 
selecting between different possible 
actions, showed a negative correlation 
with the angular gyrus activation on 
incompatibly‑primed only, and no 
correlation on compatibly‑primed 
trials. These findings suggest a new 
model, in which sense of agency 
depends as much on how we choose 
what we do, as on actually doing 
it. The positive sense of agency, or 
feeling in control, could reflect the 
default state of the brain’s action 
selection networks, while the feeling 
of loss of control could reflect angular 
gyrus monitoring the conflict within 
frontal action selection mechanisms. 
On this view, the experience of agency 
would be a form of ‘metacognition’, or 
conscious experience corresponding 
to efficiency of action selection. In 
the computational framework above, 
the planner process, or inverse 
model, must contribute to the sense 
of agency, as well as the match 
between forward model prediction and 
outcome. 
Why do we have a conscious 
experience of agency? The 
prospective aspect of agency gives a 
clue as to why the brain might provide 
a distinctive conscious experience of 
being in control. Selecting between 
alternative action choices is often a 
difficult computational problem for 
the brain. An experience of sense 
of agency corresponding to fluent 
choice may be an important signal 
for guiding these computations. 
For example, we often make errors 
by pressing the wrong button on a 
machine, or by not knowing which 
button to press. The prospective 
sense of agency may be the brain’s 
way of generating the feeling of “just 
knowing the right button to press”. 
In contrast, prospective feelings of 
non‑agency may allow time to slow 
down, perhaps switching the brain to a 
more attentive strategy of supervisory 
control. It is clearly useful to have 
such feelings prospectively, before 
pressing the wrong button, yet existing 
comparator models can only explain 
the retrospective feeling of error after 
one has pressed the wrong button. 
The prospective sense of agency 
may serve as a marker when action 
processing needs to shift from routine 
to supervisory control.
We saw above that retrospective 
sense of agency can be tricked, and 
is sometimes illusory. The prospective 
sense of agency may also be an 
illusion. Simply having a feeling of 
fluently knowing which action to 
select does not guarantee the correct 
action outcome. For example, I may 
clearly feel that I know which button 
to press on the machine, but I may 
actually press the wrong button, or 
the machine may malfunction. The 
prospective sense of agency might 
only develop once the brain has 
learned a stable relation between 
actions and outcomes.
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PrimerPerhaps the most difficult biological 
question of all might be how and why 
electrochemical neuronal activity 
in the brain generates subjective 
conscious experience such as the 
redness of red or the painfulness of 
pain. Neuroscientists track how light 
impinging on the retina is transformed 
into electrical pulses (neuronal spikes), 
relayed through the visual thalamus 
to reach the visual cortex, and finally 
culminates in activity within speech‑
related areas causing us to say ‘red’. 
But how such experience as the 
redness of red emerges from the 
processing of sensory information is 
utterly mysterious. It is also unclear why 
these experiences possess phenomenal 
characteristics, which can be directly 
accessed only from the subject 
having the experience.  This is called 
the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness 
as coined by the philosopher David 
Chalmers. The phenomenal aspect 
of consciousness or ‘what it is like’ 
character of subjective experience 
is called ‘qualia’; the singular form of 
the word is ‘quale’, from the Latin for 
‘what sort’ or ‘what kind’. In this Primer, 
we provide an overview of the term 
‘qualia’ and its conceptual issues, and 
how neurobiological approaches can 
contribute to clarify some of these 
issues. 
The difficulty with qualia is their 
subjective nature: qualia exist only 
as viewed from the inside. They 
cannot be objectively detected or 
compared like any other properties 
measured in natural sciences. The 
subjectivity of qualia allows one to 
conceive hypothetical situations 
that philosophers discuss in thought 
experiments. For instance, we can 
assume, without any contradiction, a 
person with inverted qualia who, when 
seeing the colour red, has the quale 
that you would have when seeing 
the colour green, and conversely. 
In another thought experiment 
we can conceive a philosophical 
zombie who has all the cognitive 
and perceptual abilities like us but 
lacks any phenomenal experience. 
These thought experiments are often 
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Figure 1. Qualia in broad sense and narrow sense. 
(A) The broad sense definition regards the entire phenomenal experience at one moment, including 
vision, audition, olfaction and so on, as one quale. Note that within each modality there are sub‑
modes such as colour and shape for vision. The narrow sense definition takes such submodes as 
qualia. (Adapted with permission from Balduzzi and Tononi 2009.) (B) Comparison of the broad and 
narrow definitions. In the broad sense definition, the quale for the colour of a red disk presented in 
the left visual hemisphere is considered distinct from the quale for the same stimulus shown in the 
right visual field, because the experience as a whole differs between the two situations. In the nar‑
row sense definition, qualia for colour at different locations can be meaningfully compared. used to illustrate the apparent lack of 
functional and physical relevance of 
qualia — that they are epiphenomena 
of brain activity. Nevertheless, for 
conscious animals like us humans, the
existence of qualia is real and from a 
subjective viewpoint, qualia of hunger,
pain and perception are central to 
our existence. The fact that we can 
conceive nonsensical possibilities suc
as philosophical zombies suggests tha
our conceptualization of qualia may 
still be premature. The concept itself 
needs to be further revised based upo
new observations from neurobiologica
investigation of qualia. 
Properties of qualia
When we try to define a concept, it 
is useful to consider its properties. 
In his Quining Qualia, Daniel Dennett 
argued that qualia do not have a 
property to speak of: “Qualia is a 
philosophers’ term which fosters 
nothing but confusion, and refers in th
end to no properties or features at all”.
If there is no definition or a property 
that characterizes qualia, we might as 
well discard the concept altogether. 
According to Dennett, qualia are, 
ineffable, intrinsic and private. These 
properties are ironically the properties 
that make it difficult to define qualia, 
because they appear not to have 
functional relevance. 
To characterise qualia, we need to 
find a functional property of qualia. 
Richard Gregory proposed that qualia 
signify that perception is about here 
and now, flagging the present moment.
In other words, qualia serve a function 
to distinguish what is happening now 
in the external world and what is 
happening in our mind. Vivid qualia 
accompany the former, but qualia are 
fairly dim in the latter. These types 
of functional characterisation may 
seem trivial; but they are an important 
first step towards linking qualia with 
particular neural substrates. The here 
and now nature of qualia makes us 
realise that afferent sensory inputs are 
crucial for evoking vivid qualia. Also, 
this argument illustrates that qualia 
have different levels of vividness. A red 
apple in front of us evokes vivid qualia, 
whereas thinking about the same apple
two days later can evoke only faint 
qualia.
Ramachandran and Hirstein 
(1997) proposed four functional 
characteristics of qualia. According 
to them, qualia are: 1) irrevocable, in 
the sense that subjects cannot deny qualia; 2) utilised flexibly for future 
planning, unlike those non‑conscious 
percepts that can only give rise 
to a reflex; 3) stored in short‑term 
memory; and 4) closely linked with 
attention. As we will discuss later, 
more recent studies suggest qualia 
should be distinguished from attention 
(#4) and cognitive access (#3). What 
is important here, however, is to 
realise that qualia can be analysed 
and characterised. Such an attempt 
is the first step towards scientific 
investigation of qualia.
Quale as an elementary unit of 
phenomenal experience
The tem ‘qualia’ has been used in two 
different senses: broad and narrow. 
A quale in the broad sense refers to 
the entire conscious experience at 
a single moment, which consists of multiple modalities of senses, vision, 
audition, touch and so on, and multiple 
aspects of percepts within each 
modality, for example, colour, form 
and motion in vision (Figure 1A). In this 
broad sense, the entire phenomenal 
experience at a given point in time 
is considered as one quale. On the 
other hand, a quale in the narrow 
sense refers to elementary sensations 
that are indecomposable to smaller 
experiences, such as the ‘redness’ of 
red. Sometimes, qualia can be used 
to indicate something between the 
two senses, for example, the ‘whole 
experience of vision’.
Although this may seem a matter of 
definition, it is important to be clear 
about which definition is adopted in 
any discussion of qualia. Qualia in 
the narrow sense seem to be more 
compatible with the way the term is 
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Figure 2. Neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), access (NCA) and qualia (NCQ).
(A) Wilke and colleagues used a generalized flash suppression paradigm (Wilke et al. 2009) to 
manipulate the visibility of a red circular stimulus invisible or visible by stimulus configuration. The 
neuronal activity is compared with the control condition where the stimulus was invisible due to its 
physical removal. (B,C) While recording spiking activity in the pulvinar, some neurons signalled the 
visibility of the stimulus independent of the presence (B) or absence (C) of report, suggesting that 
these spiking activities are a possible NCQ. Solid lines indicate the difference in firing rate between 
visible vs. (perceptually) invisible. Dotted lines indicate the difference in firing rate between visible 
versus physical removal trials. (D,E) The alpha (9–14 Hz) and beta (15–30 Hz) band power of the 
local field potential in the pulvinar distinguished the visibility only when the monkey reported the 
visibility (D) but not when they did not report the visibility of the stimulus (E), indicating that these 
are likely to be NCA, but not NCQ. (Modified with permission from Wilke et al. 2009.) typically used. Also the narrow‑sense 
qualia seem to be more useful for 
consciousness research. The narrow‑
sense definition, for example, allows 
us to compare qualia for two stimuli 
presented at different spatial positions, 
such as a red quale for stimulus A 
on the left side and a red quale for 
stimulus B on the right side (Figure 
1B). With the broad sense definition, 
however, qualia for two objects at 
different locations are considered to 
evoke different qualia, because the 
experiences as a whole are different 
because of their spatial difference. 
But comparison of qualia across 
space (and time) is important for the 
empirical study of qualia. With the 
narrow‑sense definition, we can now 
ask neuroscientific questions such as 
what are the neural substrates that 
allow us to perceive the red quale in 
the left visual field as the same as the 
red quale in the right visual field. 
The identification of elementary 
units has been a key in many fields 
of science. For example, atoms and 
genes are, respectively, functionally 
indivisible units in physics and biology. Qualia in the narrow sense 
may be regarded as such elementary 
units of phenomenal experience, 
indecomposable to smaller units. 
The neural correlates of qualia 
Which regions of the brain are 
candidates for producing qualia? 
Discovery of the neural correlates of 
consciousness (NCCs) — the minimal 
set of neuronal events necessary and 
sufficient for conscious experience — 
has been a major target in empirical 
approaches to consciousness. Indeed, 
the quest for NCCs propelled many 
neurobiological experiments on 
consciousness over the last decades. 
Recent studies, however, suggest that 
many of the reported putative NCCs 
may be confounded with attentional 
modulation of sensory signals or 
neuronal activity associated with 
perceptual reports. Thus, it is essential 
to distinguish the neural correlates of 
qualia (NCQs) from those related to the 
neural correlates of access (NCAs) that 
are related to attention and report. 
Although cognitive functions such 
as attention and report are often linked with conscious perception, 
such confounds can be minimized 
by using appropriate experimental 
paradigms. For example, the confound 
of attentional modulation can be 
alleviated by diverting attention from 
stimuli during an experiment. The 
confound of report could be mitigated 
by inserting trials in which reports are 
not required. This is possible when 
subjective experiences during no‑
report trials are highly predictable. 
Wilke and colleagues (Wilke et al. 2009) 
took this approach and found that the 
alpha and beta bands of the local field 
potential recorded from the pulvinar 
reflect the preparation for reports, 
while single neuron spikes in the same 
area reflect the visibility regardless of 
whether or not the monkeys reported 
stimulus visibility (Figure 2). These 
paradigms are important for isolating 
NCQs from NCAs.
Another approach to uncovering 
NCQs is to determine the level of 
neural representation at which the 
represented information corresponds 
to the information conveyed to us 
by qualia. When we experience a 
quale, we often cannot access its 
constituents, indicating that qualia 
we experience are limited to a certain 
computational stage. The concept 
of mandatory fusion is relevant for 
illustrating this point. For example, 
Japanese speakers cannot distinguish 
the phonemes �la� and �ra�; they 
both map onto the same quale. The 
physical difference between �la� and 
�ra� is in the third formant. When 
Japanese speakers listen to just the 
third formant for �la� or �ra� by itself, 
they can easily distinguish them. But 
when the first and second formants are 
played together, the sound starts to 
be perceived as a speech sound and 
Japanese speakers lose the ability to 
distinguish �la� and �ra�. This example 
indicates that the binding of formants 
into a speech sound is automatic 
and once the binding is achieved, we 
cannot access its constituents. This 
is called mandatory fusion and is a 
common phenomenon in conscious 
perception. Another example is the 
perceptual estimate of the slant 
of a surface, which is computed 
from multiple visual cues such as 
stereoscopic and texture information. 
The binding of cues occurs 
automatically and the information 
from each cue cannot be estimated 
separately in adults (interestingly this is 
possible for children). 
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Figure 3. Rewiring experiments in ferrets. 
(A) The intact visual cortex in the right hemisphere, serving as a control, receives input from the 
left visual field on the retina via the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) and lateral posterior nucleus 
(LP) as well as superior colliculus (SC). The intact auditory cortex receives inputs from the ear via 
the inferior colliculus (IC) and the medial geniculate nucleus (MGN) of the thalamus. The rewired 
left hemisphere, whose SC and connection from the inferior colliculus (IC) to MGN are destroyed, 
receives visual inputs at the visual cortex via LGN and LP and at the auditory cortex via the rewired 
retina‑MGN pathway. Later, the LGN�LP pathway was lesioned to isolate the MGN pathway. (B) 
The rewired ferrets were trained to discriminate the light impinging on the intact left visual field and 
sound from the speaker. After successful training with the intact visual field, the ferrets responded 
to the light stimulation to the rewired visual field (projecting to the auditory cortex) as if it were a 
visual stimulus. (C) Long‑range horizontal connection pattern in V1, normal A1 and rewired A1. The 
panels show the distribution of connected neurons revealed by retrograde labelling by cholera 
toxin B whose injection site is marked by the star symbols. Panels A and B adapted with permis‑
sion from von Melchner et al. (2000); panel C adapted with permission from Sharma et al. (2000).Another example is colour 
constancy. Qualia for colours are 
determined not just by the wavelength 
of the light on the retina, but we 
experience the results of colour 
computation that takes illumination 
contexts into account. We do not have 
qualia for wavelength, because the 
wavelength information is mandatorily 
fused to give rise to colour qualia. Yet 
another instance of mandatory fusion 
is projector synaesthetes who always 
experience qualia of sounds or colours 
accompanied by experience of other 
qualia. They cannot experience one 
without experiencing the other.
Perceptual metamer is a concept 
closely related to mandatory fusion. In 
colour perception, lights with different 
spectral distribution can evoke the 
same colour sensation. In a broader 
context of perception, different stimuli 
that give rise to identical qualia 
are called perceptual metamers. 
Recently, Freeman and Simoncelli 
(2011) showed grossly distorted 
visual images could be metameric for 
peripheral vision. Mandatory fusion 
and perceptual metamers are useful 
concepts to determine the level of 
neural substrates critical for the 
contents of our conscious experience. 
Moreover, they highlight the 
importance of pre‑attentive, automatic 
binding in neuroscientific investigation 
of qualia.
Do animals have qualia?
At what stage of evolution did qualia 
emerge and which animals possess 
subjective experience? And at what 
stage of development do humans 
gain qualia? At first, it may seem 
impossible to study qualia in animals 
and non‑speaking babies. We cannot 
even be sure about what kind of qualia 
other people have. How could we 
investigate qualia in other organisms 
without a language? Research from 
Mriganka Sur’s lab on ferrets suggests 
it might be possible (von Melchner 
et al. 2000 and Sharma et al. 2000). 
The researchers have developed a 
remarkable method to rewire retinal 
inputs to the auditory cortex. With a 
very elegant experiment, they showed 
that ferrets receiving visual input 
rewired to the auditory cortex see with 
their auditory cortex. How could the 
experimenters tell whether animals 
see or hear the retinal input guided to 
the auditory cortex? Their experiment 
is illustrated in Figure 3. The ferrets 
were rewired only for half of the visual field. They were originally trained to 
discriminate auditory and visual stimuli 
using stimuli presented to their intact 
auditory or visual pathways (Figure 
3A, blue; left visual field serving as a 
control). After the animals had been 
sufficiently trained to discriminate 
between visual and auditory qualia, 
they presented light to the rewired right 
visual field projecting to the auditory 
cortex (Figure 3A, red). The animals’ 
behaviour indicated that the ferrets 
experienced visual sensation despite 
the fact that the light evoked neuronal 
activity in the auditory cortex.
The qualitative difference between 
visual and auditory experience is likely 
to be rooted in the anatomical features 
of cortical microcircuitry. Normally, 
without the rewiring, auditory neurons show locally dense connections with 
other neurons within the auditory 
cortex. However, the neurons in the 
auditory cortex in the rewired ferrets 
showed widespread sparse lateral 
connections to distant neurons, like 
those in the visual cortex of the normal 
ferrets (Figure 3C). Differences in 
subjective experience of vision and 
audition may be attributed to such 
anatomical connectivity. 
Concluding remarks
We have given a brief overview of 
the concepts of qualia, the most 
elementary perceptual experiences, 
in a biologically relevant context. 
A single moment of phenomenal 
consciousness — a quale in the broad 
sense — consists of such qualia in 
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(28oC) produce fewer leaves than 
22oC‑grown controls (Figure 1A 
and Table S1). These leaves display 
reduced size and lower stomatal 
densities than leaves developed 
at 22oC, even when well‑watered 
(Figure 1B and Table S1) [9]. We 
therefore hypothesised that plant 
developmental adaptations to 
high temperature may promote 
water conservation. To test this 
hypothesis, we carried out reciprocal 
transfer experiments, measuring 
transpiration and leaf temperature, in 
plants grown at 22oC and 28oC.
Plants were grown for 3 weeks at 
22oC. Half were then transferred to 
28oC for a further week. At the start 
of the experiment, all plants were 
acclimated to room temperature 
(20oC) and uniform leaf temperatures 
confirmed by thermal imaging. Pots 
were saturated with water, sealed 
(to prevent water loss from the soil), 
weighed, randomised and returned 
to both temperatures. Similar rates of 
transpiration were observed between 
22oC‑grown and 28oC‑grown plants 
at 22oC (22–22 and 28–22; Figure 1C 
and Table S1). Surprisingly, given 
that they develop fewer stomata, 
28oC‑grown plants displayed 
greater transpiration at 28oC (28–28) 
than 22oC‑grown plants (22–28) 
(Figure 1B,C and Table S1). A similar, 
but exaggerated, response was 
observed in continuous irradiance, 
where stomata would not be exposed 
to darkness‑induced closing signals 
(Figure S1 and Table S1) [6].
The increased rates of 
transpiration observed in 28–28 
plants suggest that development 
at high temperature may enhance 
leaf cooling capacity. At 22oC, 
no significant differences in leaf 
temperature were observed between 
22–22 and 28–22 plants (Table S1). 
At 28oC, however, the leaves of 
28–28 plants were approximately 
1oC cooler than 22–28 plants (Figure 
1D and Table S1). An enhanced 
difference (>2oC) was observed 
between 22–28 and 28–28 plants 
in continuous light, consistent with 
the increased rates of transpiration 
observed in these experiments 
(Figure S1 and Table S1).
The increased rates of transpiration 
and leaf cooling in plants developed 
at high temperature could result from 
differences in stomatal size and�or 
stomatal opening capacity, which 
were measured in all conditions. No 
High temperature 
exposure increases 
plant cooling 
capacity 
Amanda J. Crawford,  
Deirdre H. McLachlan,  
Alistair M. Hetherington,  
and Keara A. Franklin*
Plants inhabit different environments 
and have evolved mechanisms 
to optimise growth within 
defined temperature ranges. In 
Arabidopsis thaliana, growth at 
high temperature (28oC) results in 
striking elongation of stems and 
increased leaf elevation from the 
soil surface [1–3]. Despite insights 
into the molecular control of these 
responses [1–5], their physiological 
significance remains unknown. Here, 
we analysed the impact of high 
temperature‑mediated development 
on plant water use strategy. We 
present the surprising finding that 
Arabidopsis plants developed at high 
temperature (28oC) show increased 
water loss and enhanced leaf 
cooling capacity in these conditions, 
despite producing fewer leaf surface 
pores (stomata). Our data suggest 
that plant architectural adaptations 
to high temperature may enhance 
evaporative leaf cooling in well‑
watered environments.
High temperature increases the 
risk of both heat damage and water 
shortage to plants. The former 
can be minimized by leaf cooling, 
achieved through the evaporation 
of water from stomata, in a process 
known as transpiration [6–8]. In 
well‑watered conditions, plants 
consume considerably more water 
than is necessary for optimum 
yield, with the majority lost via 
transpiration [7]. Here, leaf cooling 
capacity has been shown to 
positively correlate with fruiting 
prolificacy and plant fitness [8]. 
In water‑limited environments, 
there is a trade‑off between 
leaf cooling and the potentially 
injurious effects of excessive water 
loss. In addition to displaying an 
elongated architecture, plants 
developed at high temperature 
Correspondencethe narrow sense. While the concept of qualia is elusive, its neurobiological 
basis can be investigated with the 
empirical neuroscientific approach. 
For example, with a rewiring 
experiment such as the one described 
above we may be able to uncover 
patterns of neuronal connectivity 
that are associated with visual and 
auditory qualia. Once anatomical 
motifs are identified for typical visual 
and auditory experience, Thomas 
Nagel’s seemingly intractable 
question ‘what it’s like to be a bat’ 
might be addressed by examining the 
microcircuits involved in echolocation. 
At least, we can quantitatively 
evaluate the similarity between the 
circuitry for the echolocation and 
that for vision or audition, allowing 
us to infer if qualia for echolocation 
would be closer to visual or auditory 
qualia. The neuroanatomical 
approach has an important role in 
identifying neuroanatomical motifs of 
qualia. The concept of qualia will be 
refined as empirical neurobiological 
approaches reveal new facts about 
relationships between qualia and the 
brain. 
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